PRONTO Workshop
Non-tariff measures: Data, methods, and future challenges

Session 1: Primary data collection

Joint Presentation by Agencies
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Chad Bown, World Bank
Mondher Mimouni, ITC
Jürgen Richtering, WTO
Outline

1. Overview: NTM Data
2. Presentation by agencies of different data sets
   - NTM-goods data
     • NTM classification
     • Inventory data based on national legislation
     • Notifications and other WTO data
     • Antidumping database
     • Data from private sector perspective
   - Services data
3. Summary: Way forward and Role of Pronto
Non-tariff measures are

- policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both. (GNTB MAST, UNCTAD 2009)

NTBs are

- NTMs that have a ‘protectionist or discriminatory intent’. (Suggested by GNTB MAST, UNCTAD 2009)
- the “evil” form of NTMs, wherein trade restrictiveness, whether or not deliberate, exceeds what is needed for the measure’s non-trade objectives. (World Bank, 2012)

Procedural Obstacles are

- practical challenges and processes that makes compliance with the measures difficult. (ITC 2014)
- issues related to the process of application of an NTM, rather than the measure itself. (GNTB MAST, UNCTAD 2009)
NTM Data Basics: The Universe
NTM Data Basics: What data

National legislation

- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

Private sector perspective

- Business survey
- Complaints portal

Goods

Services

- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

- Business survey
- Complaints portal
Collaboration initiatives

- **Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST):** FAO, IMF, ITC, OECD, UNIDO, UNCTAD, World Bank and WTO (Observer EC, USDA, USITC)
- **Transparency in Trade Initiative (TNT):** AfDB, ITC, UNCTAD, WB; WTO linked
  - UNCTAD leads on official NTM data for goods. ITC contributes. In Africa AfDB and UNCTAD.
  - WB leads on services and on antidumping data
  - ITC leads on tariff data
- **I-TIP services** collaboration between WB and WTO
- **I-TIP goods** collaboration between WTO and UNCTAD
International NTM classification: The common language

- The Multi Agency Support Team (MAST) initiated by Group of Eminent Persons on NTB updated old UNCTAD NTM classification

- WTO (all rel. Divisions) and UNCTAD revised MAST proposal

International NTM Classification, Version 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical measures</th>
<th>Imports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>D CONTINGENT TRADE-PROTECTIVE MEASURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>E NON-AUTOMATIC LICENSING, QUOTAS, PROHIBITIONS AND QUANTITY-CONTROL MEASURES OTHER THAN FOR SPS OR TBT REASONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C PRE-SHIPMENT INSPECTION AND OTHER FORMALITIES</td>
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<th>Non technical measures</th>
<th>Exports</th>
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<td>D</td>
<td>P EXPORT-RELATED MEASURES</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>EXPORT-RELATED MEASURES</td>
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<tr>
<td>F PRICE-CONTROL MEASURES, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL TAXES AND CHARGES</td>
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<td>G FINANCE MEASURES</td>
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<tr>
<td>H MEASURES AFFECTING COMPETITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>I TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES</td>
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<td>J DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS</td>
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<td>K RESTRICTIONS ON POST-SALES SERVICES</td>
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<td>L SUBSIDIES (EXCLUDING EXPORT SUBSIDIES UNDER P7)</td>
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<td>M GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT RESTRICTIONS</td>
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<td>N INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY</td>
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<td>O RULES OF ORIGIN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Discussing a single referral document
International NTM Classification

Tree structure – Example

A SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
   A1 Prohibitions/restrictions of imports for SPS reasons
   A2 Tolerance limits for residues and restricted use of substances
      (…)
   A8 Conformity Assessment related to SPS
      A81 Product registration requirement
      A82 Testing requirement
      A83 Certification requirement
      A84 Inspection requirement
      A85 Traceability requirement
         A851 Origin of materials and parts
         A852 Processing history
         A853 Distribution and location of products after delivery
         A859 Traceability requirements n.e.s.
   A86 Quarantine requirement
   A89 Conformity assessments related to SPS n.e.s

A9 SPS Measures n.e.s.

B TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE

C PRE-SHIPMENT INSPECTION AND OTHER FORMALITIES

D CONTINGENT TRADE PROTECTIVE MEASURES

E NON-AUTOMATIC LICENSING, QUOTAS, PROHIBITIONS …

F PRICE CONTROL MEASURES INCLUDING ADDIT. TAXES …

G FINANCE MEASURES

H MEASURES AFFECTING COMPETITION

I TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES

At this level of coding: 122 measures in the classification
Progress on NTM Goods Data Collection

- Eminent Persons, MAST Group, WTO - UNCTAD
- Classification, widely accepted, committee
- ITC – UNCTAD pilot project
- Guidelines: Standardized approach
- Better coordination when working in partnerships
- Better data quality checking process
- Training on NTM data collection: Online course
- WTO notifications in i-TIP
- Business survey data using same classification
A. ARBITRARINESS OR INCONSISTENCY
2. Product classification and/or valuation.
3. Application of procedures, regulations, or requirements (including inconsistencies between local and national procedures or regulations).

B. DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOUR FAVOURING SPECIFIC PRODUCERS OR SUPPLIERS
1. Local suppliers or producers in the destination market.
2. Suppliers from other countries.
3. Large (or small) companies.

C. INE 表格填充 missing characters INEFFICIENCY OR OBSTRUCTION
1. Excessive documentation requirements.
2. Strict/detailed/redundant testing, certification or labelling.
3. Administrative delay (e.g., in authorization, approval).
4. Complex clearance mechanisms (e.g., several entities have to approve).
5. Short submission deadlines for required information or forms.
6. Outdated procedures, (e.g., lack of automation).
7. Lack of resources, (e.g., understaffing, scarce equipment in destination markets).

D. NON-TRANSPARENCY
1. Inadequate information on laws/regulations/registration.
2. Unannounced change of procedures, regulations or requirements.
3. Lack of inquiry points.
4. Non-transparent government bid or reimbursement processes.
5. Non-transparent dispute resolution.
6. Informal payment expected or required.

E. LEGAL ISSUES
1. Lack of enforcement, e.g., patents, copyrights, trade marks, confidentiality.
2. Inadequate due process/appeals process/dispute resolution.
3. Inadequate legal infrastructure.

F. UNUSUALLY HIGH FEES OR CHARGES
(e.g. for stamps, testing or other services rendered)
Services Classification

• Is there scope for common services classification?
NTM Data

National legislation
- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

Private sector perspective
- Business survey
- Complaints portal

Goods

Services
- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)
- Business survey
- Complaints portal
Official NTM data collection

• From here...  ...to here

The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

EXTRAORDINARY

 Luigi 1376/9 – 2005 සිංහලි ලියා 19 විශාල් කාලය – 2005.01.19
No. 1376/9 – WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2005

(Published by Authority)

PART I : SECTION (I) — GENERAL
Government Notifications

L.D. – B. 11/80 I

FOOD ACT, No. 26 OF 1980

REGULATIONS made by the Minister of Health in consultation with the Food Advisory Committee under No. 26 of 1980.

NIMAL SIB
Minister of Health
Uva Wellas

Colombo,
17th January, 2005.

Regulations

01. These Regulations may be cited as “Food (Labelling and Advertising) Regulations 2005.”

02. No person shall sell, offer for sale, expose or keep for sale, transport or advertise for sale, any food container unless such package or container is labelled in accordance with these regulations.

Provided however that, these regulations shall not apply to any package of food if the food is of the name or brand requested by the purchaser and is weighed, counted or measured in the presence of the purchaser.
UNCTAD NTM Data Model

- **NTM Code** (NTM classification)
- **Measure Implementation Date**
- **Measure Repeal Date**
- **Measure Description**
  Description of the measure in the regulation
- **Measure Reference**
  Specific place within the regulation
- **Affected Products Description**
  Description of affected products as stated in the regulation
- **Affected Regions Description**
  Description of affected countries/regions as stated in the regulation
- **Notes, Optional additional notes.**
## Data Availability

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<th>North America</th>
<th>Europe and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>East-Asia and the Pacific</th>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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Data Collection and Dissemination

Data collection is a collaborative effort

• UNCTAD, ITC, World Bank, AfDB (TNT partners)
• With other partners involved (Regional Secretariats, WTO, …)

Data dissemination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<th>Registration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>wits.worldbank.org</td>
<td>Official NTM data</td>
<td>Yes, no fee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(TRAINS data)</td>
<td>(and other data)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td><a href="http://www.macmap.org">www.macmap.org</a></td>
<td>Official NTM data</td>
<td>Yes, no fee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(and other data)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>i-tip.wto.org</td>
<td>Notifications</td>
<td>No, no fee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same NTM data
WTO

Notifications of trade policy measures

- Government submit official legislation, regulations, other measures
- Mainly measures applied to imports
- Fairly comprehensive coverage of most types of NTMs
- Full public dissemination via WTO documents
- Move towards online notification systems and database storage
- Analytical online dissemination increasingly through I-TIP

Reporting gaps, late reporting, inconsistent reporting & Missing information: HS codes, in-force dates (SPS TBT only)

WTO

Peer review of trade policy measures
Monitoring government “complaints” and questions

• Committee based opportunity for peer review
• Covers notifications, TPRs and also not notified measures
• Can cover also implementation / procedural issues
• Q&A processes, sometimes more formalized: STCs in SPS/TBT
• Full public dissemination via committee meeting reports and/or dedicated documents
• Some specialized online disseminations systems (STCs, AG Q&As)
• Analytical online dissemination through I-TIP for now only STCs (SPS/TBT)

The need to report and disseminate Q&As in a more structured and easily accessible way is currently under discussion.
WTO

Secretariat review of trade policy measures

• Trade policy reviews complemented by Government reports
  – Covers entire trade policy of a given country (Goods, Services, IP, …)

• Trade policy monitoring
  – Covers also export measures for which no notification requirements exist
  – Measures (Notified, officially validated, not validated)

TPR information needs to be compiled in a more structured and easily accessible way linked as much as possible to specific trade policy measures (currently under discussion).
How **WTO** fits into global **NTM** reporting

WTO NTM information gathering is part of its:

- mandate
- budget
- therefore sustainable

Coverage of NTM types - MAST classification

All NTMs well documented

WTO system of notifications TPRs, TPM and Q&As

Specificity of information available for each NTM
Temporary Trade Barriers Database (TTBD)

– Expanded from Global Antidumping Database (available since 2005)

1. **Antidumping** (31 countries), **CVDs** (17 countries)
   - Data compiled from national government announcements (Federal Register, Official Journal) and administrative authority websites
   - Historical data, with various start dates (some as early as 1980s), comprehensive within a country once data availability starts
   - AD/CVD “removal” data (dates/years) supplemented with what is reported to relevant WTO committees

2. **Safeguards** (WTO Agreement on Safeguards, all WTO members), some **China-specific safeguards** (reporting requirements different for China-safeguards)
   - Data taken from what is reported to WTO Committee on Safeguards

For all 4 policies…

• Dates of initiation, investigations, decisions, outcomes, including types of measures imposed
• Tariff-line product codes for each investigation
• For AD and CVD only: also available information (names) of petitioning firms, industry organizations, or labor groups; firm-specific outcomes for foreign firms named as targets (e.g., firm-specific duties)
Other Data Sources

• OECD Product Market Regulation index
• ...
NTM Data

National legislation

- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

Private sector perspective

- Business survey
- Complaints portal

Goods

Services

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The International Trade Centre supports SMEs in their efforts to internationalize.

In this context ITC:

1. Contributes to providing information on NTMs in destination countries with a view on facilitating exports:
   - Collection of NTMs based on official legislation in collaboration with UNCTAD under the TnT

2. Contributes to identifying priority obstacles for companies in the form of regulations and procedures
   - Business surveys
ITC-NTM regulations in MAcMap

Legislation regulating non-tariff measures (NTMs) applied by Russian Federation.

Product: 010110 - Pure-bred breeding horses and asses
Partner: World
Year: 2009
Data source: ITC (MAcMap)
Credits: N/A
Product nomenclature: HS10
NTM classification revision: NTM rev. 2008

Three approaches to NTM data presentation:
1. By regulation (SME oriented - see screenshot)
2. By NTM and product (analytical)
3. Bulk download

Selected national tariff line (NTL) code:
0101101000 - Pure-bred breeding horses and asses: horses

Official title of the legislation (English)

Administrative Regulation to be accomplished by Federal Service for veterinary and phytosanitary supervision, on granting permissions for importation to the RF and exportation from the RF, as well as transit from its territory of animals, products of animal origin, pharmaceuticals, feedstuff and feedstuff additives for animals, under quarantine products, affirmed by the order of Ministry of Agriculture of the RF, 9 January 2008, N 1

Federal Law of the Russian Federation dated on 14 May 1993 N 4979-1 About veterinary

The Decree of the Government of the RF On the affirmation of the Standing on Federal Service for veterinary and phytosanitary supervision 30 June 2004, N 327

The Decree of the Government of the RF On Customs Fees for customs formalities of products, 28 December 2004, N 863

The letter of the Federal Customs Service of RF On the list of products subject to border veterinary supervision, 20 December 2006, N 06-73/45065

The Order of the RF On the Affirmation of Rules of transportation of animals by railway 18 June 2003

The Order On the Affirmation of Rules on transportation by railway of perishable (fast-spoiling) freight

Page size: 10
ITC

Business Survey motivation/objectives

• Capture perception of exporters and importers

• Provide de facto (instead of de jure) evidence on NTMs

• Look at the specific role of NTMs implementation (related procedural obstacles)

• Compile a unique set of surveys realized with a common methodology across countries

• Complement other approaches (direct and indirect approaches) to measure revealed ‘costs’ of NTMs.
ITC
Firm level survey data

- MAST classification used (adapted version to capture companies’ perspectives)
- Captures NTM-related obstacles perceived by companies by product (HS6) and partner country
- Covers firms accounting for at least 90% of total export value of each survey country (excl. arms and minerals)
- Survey data collected in 23 countries plus 15 countries ongoing
- Survey data disseminated through country reports and stakeholder meeting
- Development of data dissemination tool linking surveys’ data to official regulations and WTO notifications
ITC – Firm level survey data online

NTM Survey Overview:

The ITC NTM survey in Kenya aims to identify burdensome non-tariff obstacles to trade faced by the Kenyan business community. The survey was implemented in collaboration with a local company, Synovate Kenya Ltd in 2011. A total of 764 exporting and importing companies across various sectors were interviewed about their experiences dealing with NTMs.
NTM Data

Goods

- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

Services

- Inventory data
- Notifications
- (STC)

National legislation

Private sector perspective

- Business survey
- Complaints portal

- Business survey
- Complaints portal
World Bank Services Trade Restrictions

Database: country coverage

103 countries (of which 79 developing)

Available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicestrade
## Data: sector/mode coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors/Sub-sectors</th>
<th>Mode 1</th>
<th>Mode 3</th>
<th>Mode 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Court representation</td>
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</table>
Data: policy coverage

Policy dimensions covered:

- Barriers to foreign entry and ownership
- Licensing requirements
- Restrictions on operations
- Regulatory environment

Focus is on measures that discriminate against foreign services and service providers; but we also cover certain non-discriminatory measures which significantly affect trade.

Policy information was collected through detailed questionnaires administered by local law firms and governments were given the opportunity to comment.
Measuring policy restrictiveness

Real value of the Database is the rich information on a range of policy variables. But there is also a need for measures that facilitate depiction of patterns and empirical analysis.

Three approaches:

• The Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) → scores based on expert judgment → on a five-point scale from completely open to completely closed [0, 25, 50, 75, 100]

• Ordinal Ranking of Policy Combinations → ranks different combinations of policy at the country-sector level in terms of relative openness

• Measuring restrictiveness by impact using econometric approaches → estimates the restrictiveness of policies based on their impact on some outcome variable of interest, controlling for other determinants
The OECD services trade restrictiveness index (STRI)

Why the STRI? Access to information on services regulations relevant for trade

To obtain the information gathered for the STRI, you have to look at 16,000 laws and regulations.

There are 135 GATS schedules with more than 100,000 commitments and 113 RTAs in force covering services.

The US federal laws and regulations on banking alone are 9949 pages long.
OECD STRI: What is the STRI?

A regulatory database
- Filled in by the Secretariat, verified and peer reviewed by Members
- Information on regulation, link to source (law/regulation), explanation where needed
- Online, frequently updated, 16000 laws and regulations
- Interactive

STRI indices
- A snapshot of trade restrictiveness
- Binary scoring of individual measures
- Scoring and weighting automated
  - Qualitative information transformed to indicators using a fixed set of rules codified in computer algorithms
- The index takes values between 0 and 1

Policy Tool
- A compare your country tool
- An interactive policy simulator
OECD STRI coverage

Sectors

- Computer services
- Construction
- Distribution
- Financial services
  - Commercial banking
  - Insurance
- Professional services
  - Accounting
  - Architecture
  - Engineering
  - Legal services
- Telecommunications
- Transport
  - Air
  - Maritime
  - Rail
  - Road
  - Courier
- Audiovisual services
  - Motion pictures
  - Broadcasting
  - Sound recording
- [Logistics]

Countries

- The 34 OECD members
- Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa
- [Colombia, Latvia, Costa Rica]

Policy areas:

- Restrictions on foreign entry
- Restrictions on movement of people
- Other discriminatory measures (national treatment)
- Barriers to competition
- Regulatory transparency
STRI (average, minimum and maximum scores by sector)
## Services Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>What</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| World Bank   | iresearch.worldbank.org/services | Services trade policy measures and key modes of delivery  
- incl. implemented/enforced measures  
- 103 countries  
- 5 sectors (19 subsectors)  
- 344 variables |
| OECD         | http://oe.cd/stri | Trade restrictive policy measures (trade, investment barriers, domestic regulations)  
- incl. de jure restrictions (legal obligations)  
- 40 countries (OECD, BRIICS)  
- 18 sectors  
- 375 variables |
| WTO          | i-tip.wto.org/services | WTO and World Bank: GATS, RTA commitments, Applied Regimes, … |
Summary and Way Forward

• Challenges

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Some important countries missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some measures missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time series</td>
<td>Comparable data mostly not available for several years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating data</td>
<td>Different sources not all integrated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different levels of detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services data</td>
<td>No commonly used classification; coverage issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey data</td>
<td>Linking them to official data could be interesting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Limitations …
Way forward

• Part of PRONTO’s objectives are:
  – “Mapping and integrating compiled and generated data on a common platform that is built on earlier efforts and aligned to ongoing initiatives”
  – And in order to make effort sustainable “… options are explored to undertake this task in cooperation with institutions active in this domain”

• Thus, PRONTO primarily tackles the integration challenge and can provide valuable insights and support to policy makers, researchers and agencies in solving other challenges, as well
NTMs and Firm Level Evidence

Lionel Fontagné\textsuperscript{1}

Sept. 24 - ITC (UNCTAD-WTO), Geneva
1. Introduction

2. Literature survey

3. Evidence from STCs and alerts

4. Survey based evidence of restrictiveness of NTMs
Introduction

- Direct evidence on protection: world average (applied) tariff protection in manufacturing: 3.2% in 2007 (MacMap-HS6)
- Indirect evidence suggests a different picture:
  - Qualitative information from business community says market access is often difficult.
  - Distribution of exporters is skewed
  - Overall protection revealed by indirect measure like border effects still very high: ≫ 100%, controlling for tariffs (De Sousa, Mayer & Zignago 2012).
- Regulations, standards: NTMs.
- Enforcement
- Procedural obstacles
- Compliance capacity of individual exporters
The four big question marks:

1. Sorting NTMs favouring trade (in presence of informational problems) versus negatively affecting exporters
2. Impact of restrictive NTMs on heterogeneous exporters’ participation and behavior in export markets?
3. Relevant source of information?
4. Net welfare effect of NT Barriers actually protecting health or safety of consumer?
Introduction

Four tentative answers:

1. Sorting: keep only NTMs negatively affecting exporters
2. Impact of restrictive NTMs on heterogeneous exporters: rely on micro evidence
3. Combination of qualitative info, administrative info, surveys
4. Net welfare effect: round-table this afternoon and Beghin, Disdier, Marette & Van Tongeren (2013) on shrimps:
   - The optimum is not necessarily the absence of regulation
   - The reinforcement of a food safety standard can be socially preferable to the status-quo
Introduction

A simple economic analysis of the impact of regulations on exporters

- NTMs may represent a fixed cost (e.g. product adaptation)
  - Increases cost of entry
  - Less productive firms may be driven out of the export market
  - Large firms may see their market share increased cet. par.
- Or a variable cost (e.g. systematic inspection of shipments)
  - Affects domestic and foreign producers differently
  - Affects equally exporters of different size
  - Affects less exporters of high-quality products
- Heterogenous exporters face shock to NTM-related fixed and variables costs differently
Introduction

Is the relevant info present in available data?

- **Fixed cost of product adaptation: survey**
  - *Large exporters see their market share increased:* custom confidential data
  - *Less productive firms driven out of the export market:* exporters balance sheets & custom confidential data

- **Variable costs of systematic inspection of shipments: survey**
  - *Affect domestic and foreign producers differently:* hardly observable (need info on domestic VA and import using same product classification)
  - *Affect equally exporters of different size:* custom confidential data
  - *Affect less exporters of high-quality products:* quality and UV differ.
Is the relevant info present in available data (cont.)?

- Additional cost but also *increased demand* if informational problems
  - Higher cost + larger market = ?
  - Focus on sub-sample of barriers

- Uncertainty on enforcement
  - Survey (e.g. questions regarding procedural obstacles)
  - Specific identification strategy (see “alerts” below)
Introduction

Broad types of direct sources of information of NTMs:

- Comprehensive list of measures (de jure) imposed by countries at product level.
  - TRAINS (notifications) or MAST data (see session this morning)
  - Perinorm: information on the most important national standards and technical rules enforced in/by EU, US, Australia, South-Africa, Japan, as well as on standards of international organizations (ISO, etc.).

- Surveys on the perception by exporters of obstacles on foreign markets (ITC, Geneva).

- Indirect evidence:
  - WTO information on trade concerns
  - EU info on alerts & US info on monthly imports refusals
Literature survey


• Examine firm’s export performance in two dimensions: export propensity (overall export share), and market diversification (number of export markets)
  • World Bank Technical Barrier to Trade Survey (2004)
  • 619 firms in 24 agricultural and manufacturing industries in 17 developing countries exporting in 5 developed markets
  • Different types of standards exhibit distinct relations with firms’ intensive and extensive margins of exports
  • Quality standards and labelling requirements: extensive +, intensive +
  • Certification procedures: extensive -, intensive -
  • Domestic firms impacted by testing procedures have a 16% smaller export share
Literature survey

- Maskus, Otsuki & Wilson (2005), "The Cost of Compliance with Product Standards for Firms in Developing Countries: An Econometric Study"

- Econometric estimation of the incremental production costs for firms in developing countries to comply with standards imposed by importing countries
  - Rely on same TBT database as Chen et al.
  - 159 firms (out of 619) in 12 (out of 24) industries located in 16 developing countries
  - A 1% increase in investment to meet compliance costs in importing countries raises variable production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13%
  - The fixed cost of compliance is USD 425,000 per firm, or 4.7% of value added on average
Reyes (2011) “International Harmonization of Product Standards and Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade”

- Response of US manufacturing firms in the electronic sector to a reduction of TBT (in the EU)
- 1996 CENELEC-IEC agreement to harmonize European product standards to international norms: EU specific standards driven to 25% from 50% of total
- World Bank EU Electrotechnical Standards Database (EUESDB), which provides an inventory of the stock of active standards published by CENELEC and their link with standards issued by the IEC (1990-2007)
Reyes (2011), cont.

Harmonization of European product standards to international norms in the electronic sector:

- Increases the probability that higher-productivity firms enter the EU market
- And the more so for firms already exporting to other markets
- Impact is negative for the intensive margin of trade for surviving trade relationships

⇒ Combination of selection and competition effects on the EU market

Slaughterhouses, cutting plants and processing firms have to comply with Directive 77/99/EEC and 64/433/EEC (= EU meat standards + additional provisions regarding product testing, transportation and administrative matters)

Firms that comply receive an EU export licence, whereas non-complying firms can sell their product on the Polish market only
Rau and Van Tongeren (2009), cont.

- Partial equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms
- Data on shape of productivity distribution from Eurostat Business Statistics
- Parameters estimated to measure impact of compliance with the EU food standards
- Homogenizing standards tend to increase the concentration of production and exports among the more productive and larger firms
Schuster & Maertens (2013), Food Standards, Heterogeneous Firms and Developing Countries’ Export Performance, WPKE Leuven

How the adoption of private food standards by individual firms affects their export performance at the IM and EM of trade

- Custom data and tax administration data on 567 asparagus export firms for the period 1993-2011
- Stratified random sample of 95 export firms
- Likelihood of certification is 7% in 2001 and 37% in 2011
- Control for reverse causality (certification decision might be determined by current export performance)
- Certification to private standard schemes does neither improve firms’ propensity to export, nor their export volumes and values
STCs as proxy for NTMs

- Problem of sorting-out restricting NTMs can be solved by focusing on the subset of regulatory measures that are considered as sizeable barriers by exporters.
- Fontagné, Orefice, Piermartini & Rocha (2013) rely on Specific Trade Concerns (STC): sub-sample of restrictive NTMs:
  - Affected exporters manage to incentive their origin country to bring the case to Geneva.
  - Country raises a concern in SPS committee of the WTO.
  - Forum to discuss issues related to an SPS measure taken by other members.
  - These concerns and their resolution are recorded by the WTO.
  - → WTO dataset on Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) on SPS.
STCs as proxy for NTMs

- EU - USA concern: an example of conformity assessment SPS measure
  - Raised in June 2005 by the EU against USA
  - Fruits and vegetables lengthly inspection procedures in the US market → commercial losses because highly perishable nature of the products.
  - US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service required that only US produced pesticides be used during the cultivation, some of which were not permitted in the EU.

- Not only Agri-food: EU - China case on cosmetics
  - Concern raised in June 2002 by the EU against China.
  - EU noticed that China had imposed (in March 2002) import restrictions on cosmetics (containing ingredients of bovine or ovine origin) from 18 exporting countries.
  - Justification: to prevent introducing BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) into China.
  - Discriminatory: did not apply in the same manner to all countries where identical sanitary conditions prevailed.
STCs as proxy for NTMs

- STCs dataset contains information on concerns raised in the SPS committee at the WTO by a claiming country against a potential trade partner, who imposes a non-tariff measure. The period covered is 1995-2010. For each concern, we have information on:
  - Claiming country and country imposing the measure
  - Product code (HS 4-digit) involved in the concern
  - Year in which the concern has been raised to the WTO
  - Whether the concern has been resolved

- 312 concerns related to SPS measures involving 203 HS-4 product lines
- 89 claiming countries; 58 countries imposing at least one SPS measure
- 21% of the measures challenged were imposed by the EU (US + Canada 13%; Japan 7.5%)
- Most sensitive industry is Meat and Edible Meat sector. Fresh fruit and vegetables also important
STCs as proxy for NTMs

Figure: Number of HS4 lines under STCs by imposing country. Period 1996-2010
STCs as proxy for NTMs

Firms’ size distribution has a larger mean value for firms exporting in markets subject to SPS concerns

**Figure:** Firm size distribution in presence/absence of SPS
STCs as proxy for NTMs

• Trade effect of restrictive product standards on the various margins of trade.
  • Probability to export (firm-product extensive margin - participation)
  • Probability to exit
  • Value exported (firm-product intensive margin)
  • Pricing strategy (trade unit values)

• Combination of two data sets
  • Specific Trade Concerns (WTO)
  • Individual exporter reporting to French Customs’ Authority
STCs as proxy for NTMs

- SPS concerns:
  - $\rightarrow$ negative effect on the EM of trade
  - $\rightarrow$ negative effect on the IM of trade
  - Exporters upgrade their products (and/or increase their prices)

- Magnitude of effects is policy relevant:
  - At the EM:
    - SPS concern decreases the probability of exporting by 4%
    - A 10% increase in the tariff reduces the probability of exporting by 2%
    - $\rightarrow$ SPS concern is equivalent to a 20% increase in the tariff
  - At the intensive margin:
    - SPS concern reduces export value (for firms staying in the market) by 18%
    - Mean tariff opposed to French exports is 6.4%: a 1 pp increase in tariffs reduces on average exports by 2%

- Heterogeneous effect across firms: big players less affected
Trade alerts and NTM-related uncertainty

Beestermoeller, Disdier & Fontagné (ongoing)

• Analyses of the impact of NTMs uncertainty on African export flows of agricultural and agro-food products
• How i) the reputation of the exporting country, ii) the sector and iii) other countries may affect uncertainty and therefore export flows
• Provide a more nuanced understanding of the impact of NTMs that fits in with the large literature on firm heterogeneity and trade
Trade alerts and NTM-related uncertainty

Beestermoeller, Disdier & Fontagné (cont’d)

- Problem of uncertainty caused by NTMs and their implementation:
  - Only a portion of shipments are inspected
  - Probability of inspections can vary with local concerns
- Uncertainty may act as a barrier in the exporting decision (EM) and in the export value (IM)
- Important issue for DCs & LDCs exporters:
  - Higher probability of border controls
  - Higher risk of the rejection of shipments
Trade alerts and NTM-related uncertainty

- Related literature: Jaud, Cadot & Suwa-Eisenmann (ERAE, 2013):
  - Impact of rising sanitary risk of agri-food products on the geographical concentration of EU food imports
  - Combine diversification of exporters to the EU at the product level & food alerts at the EU border
  - But, aggregate all exporters of a given country in a given product & ignore firm heterogeneity
  - In practice, impact of uncertainty in NTMs may differ across firms
Trade alerts and NTM-related uncertainty

Data used in BDF:

- African firm-level export data
  - World Bank’s Exporter Dynamics Database
  - Annual firm-level export data by HS6 product & destination

- EU Food Alerts:
  - EUROSTAT’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF): notifications on emergency sanitary measures taken at the border by EU members
  - All notifications by EU countries regarding non-EU countries
Trade alerts and NTM-related uncertainty

Figure: RASFF: descriptive statistics

(1) Notifications over time
(split by rejection, 1997-2010)

(2) Rejections by notifier
(per cent, 2003-10)

(3) Rejections by HS2
(per cent, 2003-10)

(4) Rejections by origin
(per cent, 2003-10)
Survey based evidence of restrictiveness of NTMs

- Complements other approaches
- Captures perception of exporters
- Provides de facto (instead of de jure) evidence on NTMs
- Looks at the specific role of NTMs implementation (related procedural obstacles)
- ITC (Geneva) compiled a set of surveys implemented with a common methodology in a sample of developing countries
Survey based evidence

- Focus on NTMs which companies experience as barriers to trade
- Underlying reasons making turning NTMs into barriers for companies
- At most detailed level: by product (HS6) and partner country
- Survey all sectors that cumulatively account for 90% of the surveyed country export value (excluding minerals and arms)
- All sectors which > 2% of total exports
- Stratification (13 sectors) based on national registers (and development of those registers if necessary)
- 23 countries; 11,567 phone interviews; 3,390 face-to-face interviews
- Weighting to account for sample design
Survey based evidence

- SSA: Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania
- MENA: Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia
- Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka
- Latin America: Jamaica, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay

- NTM classification developed by international organizations (16 main chapters)
- Survey ran by local companies trained by ITC
- 7,641 NTM cases identified (see definition below)
Survey based evidence

- NTMs representing a serious impediment for their operations
- PO related to NTMs
- PO *only*: disregarded
- NTMs applied by home or partner country
- Same for NTM-related POs
Survey based evidence

Example of treatment of F2F:

• An Egyptian exporter of electric appliances (3 different HS6) to Saudi Arabia
• Verbatim: *Product registration is very difficult and should be renewed every 2 years. The registration process itself is usually delayed for almost one year and is relatively expensive (USD 2,850) per registration of product.*
• “Product registration difficult” × 3 products × 1 destination ⇒ 3 NTM cases
• “Registration is delayed for one year”; “Registration is expensive”; : 2 NTM-related POs
• 3 NTM × 2 POs ⇒ 6 PO cases
Survey based evidence

Issues arising when combining country-level results

- Different size of firm sample
- Different propensity to participate in F2F
- Assumptions: 1) adjust the number of companies in the PS of each country 2) Adjust participation rate to F2F 3) Keep affectedness
- Removes differences due to size in the PS and propensity to participate to the FTF

Intrinsic limits:

- Perception data implies differences in scaling obstacles between countries
- Non-exporters not surveyed and might be deterred by NTMs
- Affected exporters (according to PS) might not accept the F2F
- Sectoral composition effects
- Barriers reported mainly by least productive firms: counterfactual of firms not affected absent
- Private standards absent
Figure: Distribution of NTM cases by sector and country applying the NTM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Developed country</th>
<th>Developing country</th>
<th>Transit Country</th>
<th>Regional partner</th>
<th>Private Standard</th>
<th>Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- Blue: Developed country
- Red: Developing country
- Green: Regional partner
- Orange: Private Standard
- Purple: Home
Survey based evidence

Figure: Types of burdensome NTMs by sector

Agriculture

- Technical requirements: 22%
- Conformity assessment: 11%
- Pre-shipment inspection and other entry formalities: 5%
- Charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures: 5%
- Quantity control measures: 2%
- Finance Measures: 35%
- Rules of origin and related certificate of origin: 3%
- Other import related measures: 9%

Manufacturing

- Technical requirements: 11%
- Conformity assessment: 2%
- Pre-shipment inspection and other entry formalities: 9%
- Charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures: 13%
- Quantity control measures: 35%
- Finance Measures: 3%
- Rules of origin and related certificate of origin: 5%
- Other import related measures: 22%
Thank You
Gravity, NTMs, and CGE

Joseph Francois

WTI--University of Bern

PRONTO WP1 workshop
Geneva, September 2014

We appreciate support under the EU FP7 project Productivity, Non Tariff Barriers, and Openness, Grant agreement no: 613504.
Overview

• “Easy” questions we would like to answer: a wish list

• Mapping available data for econometrics

• Moving from gravity to ex post and ex ante assessments
  – Econometrics
  – CGE etc

• Talking points for moving forward
Dear Santa

I’ve been very ✅ Good  ☐ Bad

My trading partner has been ☐ Good  ✅ Bad

• What is the impact of current regulatory barriers?
• How important is regulatory divergence?
• Can we tell if agreements on NTBs have worked (do we have, or will we have, time series to look at?)
• Which NTBs matter the most?
• How do we include regulatory benefits (consumer safety, lower rate of industrial accidents, etc) in NTM assessments on a consistent basis?
• How do we distinguish discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures?
• To what extent do we expect NTB reductions to be discriminatory?
• How do we assess “aggregate effect” of a basket of measures? (or can we really look at measures in isolation?)
• What about regime uncertainty?
“Easy” Questions w.r.t. NTBs

- What is the impact of current regulatory barriers?
- How important is regulatory divergence?
- Can we tell if agreements on NTBs have worked (do we have, or will we have, time series to look at?)
- Which NTBs matter the most?
- How do we include regulatory benefits (consumer safety, lower rate of industrial accidents, etc) in NTM assessments on a consistent basis?
- How do we distinguish discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures?
- To what extent do we expect NTB reductions to be discriminatory?
- How do we assess “aggregate effect” of a basket of measures? (or can we really look at measures in isolation?)
- What about regime uncertainty?
Mapping from data to gravity

• Firm and regulatory survey data
  – MFN regulatory assessments
  – Pairwise regulatory assessments
  – Integrating questions
  – Soft concepts that are otherwise relevant

• Issues with gravity
  – Pairwise framework without pairwise data
  – Guiding structural estimation around pitfalls
  – Lack of data

• Going beyond gravity
  – Repeated firm and expert “subjective” assessments
Mapping from data to gravity
Firm and Regulatory Survey Data

• MFN vs Pairwise regulatory assessments:
  – The data we get do not usually provide pairwise scores
  – Interaction with FTA data may provide some information
  – Intra-EU and intra-FTA or intra-NAFTA and extra-NAFTA might provide a basis for comparison (so only need pairwise questions for limited set of countries) ➔ integrating questions
Integrating Questions: example

2. EXPORTING FIRMS: impact of NTBs on exports

2.1 OPERATING COST IMPACT OF NTBs IN ASEAN
Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is easiest to export to the market and 10 is prohibitively costly to export to the market, how would you rank each of these markets in terms of variable costs for exports? 0 \(\leftrightarrow\) 10

2.2 Please identify other important markets for your firm
Examples: JPN, KOR, USA, CHN, UK

2.3 OPERATING COST IMPACT OF NTBs OUTSIDE ASEAN
Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is easiest to export to the market and 10 is prohibitively costly to export to the market, how would you rank each of these markets in terms of variable costs for exports? 0 \(\leftrightarrow\) 10

2.4 OVERHEAD COST IMPACT OF NTBs IN ASEAN
Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is easiest to export to and 10 is prohibitively costly to export to due to regulations and access restrictions, how would you rank each of these markets in terms of overhead/fixed costs for exports? 0 \(\leftrightarrow\) 10

2.5 Please identify other important markets for your firm
(same as in 2.2)

2.6 OVERHEAD COST IMPACT OF NTBs OUTSIDE ASEAN
Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is easiest to export to and 10 is prohibitively costly due to export to due to regulations and access restrictions, how would you rank each of these markets in terms of overhead/fixed costs for exports? 0 \(\leftrightarrow\) 10
Mapping from data to gravity: soft concepts that matter

• The origin of barriers is not always deliberate. Legitimate goals can be reached in different ways. This in turn can lead to regulatory divergence. Examples include regulation of chemicals and motor vehicles.

• Not all regulatory barriers can actually be negotiated and reduced. For example, the Japanese require legal documents in Japanese. This concept is called actionability.

• Barriers can be grouped broadly into those are cost raising barriers, and those that instead are rent generating barriers (i.e. they generate rents by limiting competition and market access).

• Semantics matter: NTBs and NTMs.
Issues with NTB data and gravity

- FTA effects might not, even when interacted with NTB indicators, answer the questions we wanted to ask:
  - High NTBs might also mean less trade within in FTAs
  - Existing FTAs might not cover “new issues” like regulatory divergence. (example: REACH and intra-EU chemicals trade)

- NTB data and restriction indexes (like OECD vs World Bank STRIs) might not provide a breakdown between **discriminatory** vs. **non-discriminatory** regulations. Example: lots of laws vs. a lawless regime. What do counts tell us in this case?

- Structural estimation can get AVEs quite wrong if structure is wrong (new-fangled residual methods), so we want methods that do not assume all things unexplained are NTBs.
Issues with NTB data and gravity: Coverage of Regional Agreements

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<th>trade million USD</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>322</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>223</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>149</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>total FTA pairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>non FTA pairs</td>
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<td>7,022,810</td>
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<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>12,197</td>
<td>13,639,065</td>
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Issues with NTB data and gravity: estimates using WTO notifications

Total Goods Trade 2011 (GLM logistic regressions) regressions with generic FTA, FTAxNTB interactions, and FTA depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.73)*</td>
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* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
## Issues with NTB data and gravity: estimates using WTO notifications

Total Goods Trade 2011 (GLM logistic regressions) regressions with generic FTA, FTAxNTB interactions, and FTA depth

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We really need rankings of intra- and extra-NTBs for specific agreements.
Issues with NTB data and gravity: example of intra-EU and extra-EU trade NTB scores

Source: CEPR (2013)

Extra-EU (Intra-EU) refers to NTMs faced by non-EU (EU) firms when operating in the EU.
Issues with NTB data and gravity: example of intra-EU and extra-EU FDI NTB scores

source: See text. Extra-EU(Intra-EU) refers to NTMs faced by non-EU(EU) firms operating in EU.

NTB survey data.
Feasible reductions

Reduction to zero infeasible (and does not maximize welfare): down to intra-EU level (1+α′) should be attainable:

Efficiency gain: (α-α′)/(1+ α)
Issues with NTB data and gravity: interpretation of feasibility within FTAs/CUs

Questions on NTBs for modelling
- How big are the barriers (AVEs)?
- Can they be addressed?
- What is the impact in this case?
  - Fixed costs
  - Marginal costs
  - Market structure
  - Non-economic objectives
- What does this mean for other sectors?
  - Downstream effects
  - General equilibrium effects
- What does this mean for other countries?
  - Discriminatory or not
  - Compliance costs

Feasible reductions

Reduction to zero infeasible (and does not maximize welfare): down to intra-EU level \((1+\alpha')\) should be attainable:
Efficiency gain: \((\alpha-\alpha')/(1+\alpha)\)
Issues with NTB data: bindings vs applied rates

Borchert, Ingo; Batshur Gootiiz and Aaditya Mattoo (2011)

CGE implementation

- Data and implementation challenges
  - rents vs iceberg costs
  - Interpretation of econometric evidence
    - Past FTAs as benchmarks
    - What about NTBs not in past FTAs (food, chemicals, regulatory divergence)
  - entry costs vs marginal costs
  - spillovers?
  - bindings vs applied rates
    - will we see policies change?
    - what about uncertainty?
An example: various NTB effects
EU output effects from T-TIP

- Chemicals: 0.37%
  TOTAL: 0.37%

- Motor vehicles: 1.54%
  TOTAL: 1.54%

- Electrical machinery: -7.28%
  TOTAL: -7.28%

- Other machinery: 0.37%
  TOTAL: 0.37%

- Insurance: 0.83%
  TOTAL: 0.83%

- Water transport: 1%
  TOTAL: 1%

Legend:
- **Blue**: tariffs
- **Red**: total NTMs goods
- **Purple**: direct spillovers
- **Green**: total NTMs services
Talking Points

• Firm and regulatory survey data
  – MAST-goods. Can we have MAST-services?

• Regulatory contents of PTAs (DESTA+?)

• Issues with gravity
  – Lack of data: can we offer an integration of trade flow, value, and data cube = COMTRADE+BACI+NTBs?
  – How do we focus on the questions we actually need to answer? (MFN vs. preferential, impact of convergence, mutual recognition, etc)

• Sustainability and looking past gravity
  – Is there a way to track progress consistently linked to specific agreements?
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act

Chad P. Bown, The World Bank
Joel P. Trachtman, Tufts University

Published in World Trade Review (2009)

The American Law Institute
Reporter’s Studies on WTO Case Law
Chain of Events

- **September 2000**: Brazil imposes ban on imports of retreaded tyres
- **January 2002**: MERCOSUR court rules in favor of a Uruguay legal challenge to Brazil’s ban
- **March 2002**: Brazil complies with MERCOSUR ruling by exempting from the ban retreaded tyre imports from MERCOSUR members (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay)
- **November 2003**: EU tyre retreading association (BIPAVER) initiates a complaint under the EC’s Trade Barriers Regulation
- **June 2005**: EU requests WTO consultations with Brazil under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); this results in a Panel Report, then Appellate Body Report
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres: The Markets and Trade at Stake

Figure 1. Brazil’s imports of retreaded tyres, 1997–2006

Figure 2. Brazil’s imports of retreaded tyres under MERCOSUR, 1997–2006

Source: Data collected by authors. Brazil imports under HS (1996) category 401210, data taken from the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) via WITS.

Figure 3. EU exports of retreaded tyres to other MERCOSUR countries, 1997–2006

Figure 4. EU exports of tyres to Brazil, 1997–2006

Source: Data collected by authors. EU exports under HS (1996) categories 4011 (new tyres) 401210 (retreaded tyres), data taken from the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) via WITS.
Additional Trade Data on Retreaded Tyres

Figure 5. EU reliance on the Brazilian market for retreaded and new tyre exports, 1997–2006

Source: Data collected by authors. EU exports under HS (1996) categories 4011 (new tyres) 401210 (retreaded tyres), data taken from the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) via WITS.

Figure 6. Total extra-EU retreaded tyre exports, 1997–2006

Source: Data collected by authors. EU exports under HS (1996) category 401210 (retreaded tyres), data taken from the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) via WITS.
Potential Regulatory Concern

• Tyres require disposal after they are used, and this disposal leads to environmental and health costs to society not borne by the consumer (negative consumption externality)

• A “Brazilian once-used” tyre – defined as purchased new in Brazil and used one time in Brazil – can be re-treaded to obtain a second use, thereby delaying disposal of the tyre

• To (over-) simplify, we will model the production of re-treaded tyres as generating a local positive production externality – e.g., it delays the health/environmental costs of ultimate disposal
A Simple Model of Brazil’s retreaded tyre market

- **MPC**: private supply curve
- **MSC**: social supply curve (including positive externality)
- **D**: domestic demand
- Brazil is a small (price-taking) importer
- The EU is a lower cost foreign supplier relative to the rest of MERCOSUR ($P_{EU} < P_M$)
1. Social Optimum: equate MSC=MSB

- $Q_7$: consumption
- $Q_3$: domestic production
- $M = Q_7 - Q_3$: import from the low cost foreign provider (EU)
2. Market Equilibrium: equate MPC=MPB
- $Q_7$: consumption
- $Q_1$: domestic production
- $M = Q_7 - Q_1$: import from the low cost foreign provider (EU)

Compared to social optimum:
- Imports too large
- Inefficiency? Too little domestic production ($Q_1 < Q_3$)
3. First –Best Policy:
- ‘Targeting principle’ (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963)
- Subsidy to production of re-retreaded tyres of $\tau(\epsilon) = P_S - P_{EU}$
- $Q_7$: consumption
- $Q_3$: domestic production
- $M = Q_7 - Q_3$: import from the low cost foreign provider (EU)

**Compared to market equilibrium:**
- Imports are slightly smaller because domestic production is larger ($Q_3 > Q_1$)
4. Second–Best Policy

• **Import tariff on** re-retreaded tyres of $\tau(\varepsilon) = P_S - P_{EU}$

• $Q_5$: consumption

• $Q_3$: domestic production

• $M = Q_5 - Q_3$: import from the low cost foreign provider (EU)

**Compared to first-best:**

• Imports are smaller because domestic consumption is smaller ($Q_5 < Q_7$)

• ‘By-product’ distortion introduced by second best policy which increases prices to consumers
Brazil’s Actual Policies: potentially second best?

5. Brazil’s 2000 Import Ban as Second–Best?

- Import ban on re-retreaded tyres creates scarcity so that price increases to $P_B$
- $Q_4$: consumption
- $Q_4$: domestic production
- $M = 0$: zero imports

**Compared to second-best tariff:**

- Economic welfare falls
- Large loss in consumer surplus
- Loss of all government (tariff) revenue
- Too much domestic production of retreaded tyres ($Q_4 > Q_3$)
What would it take for Brazil’s actual import ban policy to approach a second best policy?

What if the externality is really large?
- MSC\textsuperscript{1} is marginal social cost (not MSC)
- Intersection of MSC\textsuperscript{1} and P\textsubscript{EU} occurs at Q\textsuperscript{*3} ≥ Q\textsubscript{4}

Compared to social optimum:
- Large production subsidy (so large that Brazil would become a net exporter of retreaded tyres at Q\textsuperscript{*3})

Compared to a (prohibitive) import tariff:
- Same economic welfare

Conclusion: assessment of whether Brazil’s import ban is “legitimate” second best policy requires information on the size of the underlying externality
Is Brazil’s import ban a “legitimate” second best policy?

• This requires information on the size of the underlying externality

• **Specifically, what are the costs to Brazilian society of the disposal of tires?** (I.e., how much additional social benefit is achieved by delaying disposal through re-treading?)

• Need to put a monetary figure on the externality to evaluate different policy options

**Key implication for the NTM data work:**

• Need to develop policy data sets so transparently so that they can be combined with other data sets (regulations, trade, production, externalities) to contribute useful information.
Additional problems not helping Brazil’s argument:

- Brazil allows “exemptions” to MERCOSUR partners and so does not fully enforce the import ban, this leads to a further decrease in domestic production (Figure 10)

- Brazil allows imports of used tyres (substitution in consumption for re-treaded tyres); this shifts in demand for re-treaded tyres, decreasing domestic production further (Figure 9)